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One policy which has not formally been implemented, nominal GDP or GNP targeting, is not considered 1 in this paper. While similar in some respects to an inflation targeting regime, inflation rates are more meaningful to economic agents than some aggregate nominal income measure and price level data are available in a relatively more timely fashion.
See, for example, Berg and Jonung (1998) for the Swedish experience with price level targeting during 2 the 1930s. In the US, there have been many attempts to reform the Federal Reserve Act to mandate some form of inflation control. Stabilization bills in the 1920s, making price stability the target for the Fed failed to be enacted, as were several bills introduced in the 105 congress (1997). th Readers are referred to Haldane (1995) , Leiderman and Svensson (1995) , Laidler (1997) , Mishkin and 3 Posen (1997) , and Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (1996) , for comprehensive overviews.
Finding a monetary regime which can deliver some form of price stability, as well as satisfactory economic performance, has always been more convincingly explained in theory than in practice. Consequently, governments have, over time, experimented with policies ranging from some metallic standard (e.g., gold, silver, or bimetallic), through various forms of exchange rate pegging (e.g., Bretton Woods, European exchange rate mechanism), to the introduction of currency boards (e.g., as in Hong Kong, Argentina, or Estonia). The 1 latest fashion in monetary policy formulation is a renewed interest in inflation targeting. The policy has 2 attracted the attention of policymakers and the public alike. Although imperfect, inflation targeting seemingly avoids some of the drawbacks of competitor policy regimes. Inflation targets were also introduced at a time when it became fashionable to treat central banks as being autonomous within -but not from -government.
The extensively developed rationale for inflation targeting and the ingredients of an inflation targeting policy are reviewed in the following two sections. However, there has been relatively less emphasis placed on 3 comparative assessments of inflation performance under inflation targeting among the group of countries that have formally adopted the policy. An alternative perspective is to ask whether inflation targeting influences the time series properties of inflation. To explore this issue, I estimate a simple model which illustrates whether inflation persistence has changed in a significant fashion in inflation targeting versus non-inflation targeting countries. The paper concludes by noting that it is too early for a definitive assessment of inflation targeting.
Yet, from the standpoint of economic analysis and empirical performance to date, a policy of inflation control offers as good a chance as any policy regime to produce consistently good macroeconomic performance.
Competing Policies and Institutions for Price Stability
This section briefly reviews some of the monetary policy regimes implemented in recent decades. Chief among these are policies designed to peg or fix the exchange rate. Over the last century or so, policies of this kind have by far been the most popular, especially if we include various vintages of the gold standard. The 2
The correlation between statutory central bank independence and economic growth is even more opaque 4 but this is an issue which, to date, has received relatively less attention. See, however, Alesina and Summers (1993) and Debelle (1996) .
If allowance is made for the distinction between tradeable and non-tradeable goods, small persistent 5 differentials are possible.
principal drawbacks of such regimes include their vulnerability to sustained economic shocks, their inherent lack of flexibility, and their easy manipulation through political pressure.
The Bretton Woods era of pegged exchange rates was notable for the absence of large international economic shocks (Bordo 1993) . When these did take place, most industrial countries eventually allowed their currencies to float vis-à-vis the US dollar. Similarly, the economic shock generated by German economic reunification in 1990 produced strains in the European Monetary System that quickly brought to the fore its lack of flexibility. Political considerations have always loomed larger in any decision to peg or revalue an existing peg, often with significant economic consequences. From the Gold Standard (e.g., Eichengreen 1995) right up to the present Asian currency crisis (Willett 1998) , political economy considerations surrounding fixed exchange rate regimes have often prevented them from becoming an adequate source of macroeconomic discipline.
If inflation is largely a monetary phenomenon, and a stable inflation-output trade-off does not exist because rational agents' decision rules are regime-dependent, then it would appear desirable to insulate as much as possible the monetary authorities from political influence. This essentially is the central message of advocates for central bank autonomy or "independence" (e.g., Cukierman 1992, Alesina and Summers 1993) .
Unfortunately, however, the negative correlation between inflation and some index of central bank statutory independence is neither robust to the construction of the index (e.g., Banaian, Burdekin and Willett 1998) , nor can such a relationship be reconciled with estimates of central bank reaction functions (Johnson and Siklos 1996) . At the heart of questions involving the choice of policy regimes is the notion of credibility. Any virtues 4 inherent in providing a central bank with sufficient statutory autonomy will be of little value if the markets and the public cannot confidently expect the monetary authority to achieve targets it might set for itself, possibly in conjunction with fiscal policy. Similarly, a fixed exchange rate regime cannot be credible if, for example, the inflation differential vis-à-vis the country whose exchange rate is pegged is persistently different from zero 5 or if other fundamentals (e.g., the stage of the business cycle) are out of synch for an extended period of time.
The Design of Inflation Targets
An inflation target can mitigate the credibility problem in a number of ways. First, inflation targeting can help clarify the tasks of the central bank and quantifies them in an objective and verifiable manner. Second, Since a negative aggregate supply shock would ordinarily be inflationary and reduce economic activity, a 6 tightening of monetary policy is uncalled for under the circumstances.
Whether underlying inflation rates exclude a significant portion of items from the total CPI varies, of 7 course, across countries. For an illustration in the Canadian and New Zealand cases, see Siklos (1997, Figure A-3) . For other inflation targeting countries, see Haldane (1995) .
Israel also targets inflation but is omitted because of the ambiguity about the significance of their targets 8 (see Bufman, Leiderman and Sokoler 1995) . In 1998, however, the Bank of Israel began to publish an inflation report.
In the sense that an explicit goal for inflation is announced. Countries such as France, Denmark and 9 Italy have also announced informal targets in the run-up to European Monetary Union (EMU). Although the Maastricht Treaty specifies price stability as the ultimate goal of monetary policy, the European Central Bank announced in October 1998 that, in addition to an inflation target of 2% or less in a European-wide Consumer Price Index, it would assign "an important role" to a money supply growth target, as well as to a "wide range of financial indicators" (European Central Bank 1998). by adopting statutes that ensure the autonomy of the central bank, the location of the responsibility for meeting the targets is also well defined. Central bank accountability and transparency then take on important roles.
Third, experience with an inflation targeting regime can readily influence expectations of inflation which are central in economic agents' decision-making process.
In general, all inflation targets, as currently administered, have a few common elements such as the requirement to achieve a desired inflation rate in terms of a cost of living index, usually the Consumer Price Index (CPI). However, inflation targeting countries specify caveats for these targets, usually to prevent an anomalous monetary policy shock in the event of negative aggregate supply shocks. As a result, the 6 operational guide for monetary policy is often stated in terms of "core" or underlying inflation, that is, total CPI inflation exclusive of food, energy prices and possibly indirect taxes. Finally, the calculation period for 7 inflation is, with one exception, the year-on-year percent change in the targeted price index. held expectations about the absence of inflation." (Crow 1997, p. 73; emphasis added) . Svensson (1998) argues that inflation forecasts become the intermediate target of policy. Benanke and Woodford (1997) point out, however, that following such a policy is problematic, in part because, if the inflation forecast and the target are essentially the same, the inflation forecasting exercise has no practical use.
The inflation targeting countries are the ones listed in Table 1 . A simple unweighted average of their 11 inflation rates was used. Other groupings of the inflation targeting group of countries do not fundamentally alter the overall impressions given by Figure 1 .
Perhaps largely for this reason, these countries are, in effect, perceived by the public as pursuing an 12 inflation objective. Siklos and Wohar (1997) provide a more formal assessment of the emergence of convergence in 13 monetary policy for a group of 10 industrial countries and found convergence in inflation rates but not in nominal interest rates. Also, see Pollard (1996) . for deciding who is actually responsible for setting the inflation target. The target is determined by the central bank in 3 of 7 countries, the government sets the target in two other countries, while the decision is joint in the two remaining cases. In 5 of the 7 countries with an inflation target, central banks are required or voluntarily provide a formal separate report on the inflation outlook in their country. Even in countries in which the central bank does not produce a formal report some reporting requirement exists. Finally, only 3 of the 7 central banks publish explicit inflation forecasts. Whether private sector forecasters ought to anchor their forecasts to ones announced by the central bank, and the role such forecasts play in increasing the accountability of the monetary authorities, is an important area of current research.
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Inflation Performance in a Cross-Section of Countries Figure 1 plots the five year inflation rate for the inflation targeting countries as well as for the US, 11 Germany, and Switzerland, since the late 1960s using quarterly data. The latter countries are considered have the best long-run inflation performance among industrialized nations while not formally adopting an inflation target. The five year horizon is used purely for expository purposes here as the shorter-run properties of 12 inflation in these same countries is examined in greater detail below. There are a number of potentially interesting features in the data. First, inflation performance in the inflation targeting countries appears to have been consistently worse from the early 1970s until the early 1990s than in the comparator countries. Second, the mid-1990s reveals an apparent convergence in inflation rates among the group of inflation targeting and non-inflation targeting countries. Some authors (e.g., Cukierman 1992 , Laidler 1997 ) associate the 13 improvement in inflation performance among inflation targeting countries as the outcome of a combination of legislative changes, which clarified the responsibilities of central banks in the area of monetary policy, and the introduction of inflation control objectives. Finally, note that, prior to the end of the Bretton Woods era of pegged exchange rates, and the first of two major oil price shocks during the 1970s, inflation rates across the group of countries considered were broadly similar. Nevertheless, inflation differentials were somewhat higher at the time than in the most recent history of inflation. Note also that the disinflation appears to have begun in Switzerland and Germany shortly after the first oil price shock (1972) (1973) (1974) , albeit with some interruption in the early 1980s, while the downward trend in inflation rates in the inflation targeting countries since the late 1970s is fairly continuous. The US appears to have lagged behind the other countries in experiencing a sustained drop in inflation but the rate of deceleration appears to be relatively more pronounced than elsewhere and follows on the heels of the monetary reforms begun in October 1979 under then Fed Chairman Paul Volcker. Note also that average inflation rates are rather slow to change over time in all countries. This important property is explored empirically in more detail in the following section. Finally, we observe that average inflation rates in inflation targeting countries appear to have fallen before the formal adoption of inflation targets. Table 2 provides further summary statistics about inflation performance in selected industrial countries. Mean annual inflation rates are provided for a sample of quarterly data since the late 1950s or early 1960s, as well as for sub-samples consisting of the periods before and after Bretton Woods, and, where relevant, the era of inflation targeting. As a rough guide to the volatility of inflation in the different samples, the standard deviation is also provided.
Among the group of inflation targeting countries, mean inflation rates are lower in the period since inflation targets were announced than either before or since the end of Bretton Woods. Note, however, that average inflation rates in all countries sampled rose after Bretton Woods was abandoned. The improvement in inflation performance is most impressive since inflation targets were introduced, especially when contrasted with the era since exchange rates floated (the two samples overlap somewhat, of course). Since other institutional changes also took place around the time inflation targets were announced it is not clear how much of the reduction in inflation can be attributed to the inflation objectives alone. Moreover, average inflation rates in the US, Germany, and Switzerland compare favorably with those in inflation targeting countries over roughly the same period. Therefore, among the group of countries with formal inflation control objectives, a factor in their success at reducing inflation may be the "global" nature of the recent disinflation. Inflation volatility has risen since the end of Bretton Woods in most countries but has been lower since inflation targets were announced. Indeed, inflation volatility in the inflation control era is generally lower than at any time since the late 1950s.
Evaluated as B = (log P -log P )x100, where P is the CPI in quarter t in a given year. Data sources 14 t t t-4 t are provided in the Tables and Figures. Equation (1) is said to be a random walk with drift if $ =1 ($ …0) , and is a pure random walk if $ =0 and $ =1. In this case, inflation is said to have a unit root and persistence is then infinite. Tests (not shown) 1 confirm the presence of a unit root in inflation in all the countries sampled. Unfortunately, the power of tests to discriminate between $ =1 and values close to 1, is poor. Indeed, structural breaks in a time series can often lead to 1 a non-rejection of the unit root hypothesis, as we shall see. However, it is also the case that any (trend) stationary porcess can be approximated by a unit root process. See Campbell and Perron (1991) and Hatanaka (1996, chapter (1)
Inflation Persistence
Economists have, for some time, been interested in empirically ascertaining how economic shocks impact the economy into the future. The effects of such shocks can persist over time. However, the degree to which shocks have persistent effects on inflation can be influenced by assumptions about the properties of the time series of interest, as we shall see. Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991;  henceforth A-S) argue, using long historical time series for the US and the UK, that changes in the exchange rate regime, such as the end of the Gold Standard and Bretton Woods produced significant shifts in inflation persistence. Indeed, inflation appears to have become highly persistent since the end of World War II. Persistence refers to an important statistical property of inflation, namely that its current value is strongly influenced by its past history. If the data generating process for inflation is assumed to follow a first order autoregressive process (AR(1)) then we can write:
where B is the (annual) rate of inflation in the CPI at time t, , is the residual in the above regression and t t 14 inflation persistence is measured by the coefficient, $ , on lagged inflation. When the AR coefficient is close 1 to one, the process is said to be stationary , but highly persistent. Burdekin and Siklos (1999; henceforth B-S) use a specification such as (1) and find that, while the Gold Standard represents a significant event in the history of inflation for the US, the UK, Canada and Sweden, changes in domestic monetary institutions -e.g., central bank reforms -and oil price shocks are equally good candidates for shifts in inflation persistence since the end of World War II. The potential for inflation targeting to change inflation persistence has not heretofore been considered in empirical work.
Why might an inflation target lead to significant changes in $ ? For example, if inflation targeting 1 represents a regime change, one could expect the impact of the new policy to be reflected in economic agents' model of inflation. In particular, while the price level might continue to drift upward, the inflation rate should fluctuate transitorily around the mid-point of the target range and might cease to behave like a random walk.
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An interesting question is whether the fluctuations around the middle of an inflation target band would 16 be expected to be asymmetric. Thus, for example, some central banks might follow a policy of benign neglect if actual inflation tends to fluctuate near the bottom of the inflation band while actively preventing inflation from reaching the top of the band.
Such a scenario also presumes, of course, that the inflation target is credible, a question to be considered below.
One would therefore expect inflation, if it were highly or even infinitely persistent before the adoption of a target, to become less persistent following the adoption of credible inflation targets. The reason is that a rise in inflation would be expected to be brief while the monetary authorities might not tolerate a persistent fall in inflation. 16 Figure 2 provides point estimates of $ for ten year samples which "roll" at two year intervals since 1 1968. For the most part inflation rates have been highly persistent, a notable feature of inflation performance in many countries since the end of World War II (also see A-S 1991, and B-S 1999) . Nevertheless, persistence is generally lowest for the US since 1982 and relatively highest for the inflation targeting group of countries.
However, given the wide variation in inflation performance across countries since the 1960s, it is not clear that the estimates shown in Figure 2 provide a complete picture. Also, it is unclear whether inflation persistence has, for example, been significantly different, in a statistical sense, across the countries considered in Figure 2 . In particular, it is not obvious what has been the impact on inflation persistence of, say, changes in exchange rate regimes or the adoption of inflation targets, among other policy shifts which could be considered. Moreover, there are relatively few independent observations in Figure 2 to provide convincing evidence about the persistence question. Therefore, columns (1) and (2) in Table 3 then consider whether the ending of Bretton
Woods or the adoption of inflation targets represent structural breaks in specification (1), in a statistical sense.
The relevant Chow tests reveal that, at conventional significance levels, only Canada, and possibly New Zealand, show signs of a break in inflation persistence since inflation targets were introduced. Inflation persistence also appears little affected by the end of Bretton Woods except in the case of Australia and Finland.
A difficulty here is that Chow tests are, strictly speaking, valid only if inflation is stationary. One reason inflation may be conveniently viewed as non-stationary (i.e., $ =1), is that the econometrician has difficulty 1 identifying the timing of structural breaks in the data, and these bias estimates of persistence toward 1. A related problem occurs when a change in the behavior of a time series does not coincide with the historical dating of an event.
An additional perspective can also be gained by taking equation (1) and estimating inflation persistence over specific sub-samples. Estimates (and their standard errors) are provided in column (3) through (6) in Table   3 . It is immediately clear that persistence is high in most samples and it may be convenient to treat $ as targeting countries (see Figure 1 ) suggests several substantial changes in the level of inflation over the decades.
As a result, tests based on (1), for example, may be biased toward the finding that $ is 1, that is, toward the 1 conclusion that inflation contains a unit root. It is now well-known that unit root tests are biased toward the non-rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root, if there is a structural break in the form of a permanent change in average inflation rates. However, what if one views the dating of a potential structural break to be unknown or correlated with the data (i.e., endogenous)? Although many view this to be a desirable approach,
it does leave open the possibility that a break-point in a time series is attributed entirely to the policy change when, in fact, another shock which happens to have hit the economy around the same time is the root cause of the shift. Hence, the importance of historical and institutional analysis in supplementing this form of testing. Perron and Vogelsang (1992) propose a test of the unit root hypothesis when the date of a structural change (T ) is unknown, using the following version of (1):
b Equation (2) differs from (1) by incorporating the possibility that the inflation process gradually evolves over time, as appears to be the case based on actual inflation rates (see Figure 1 ). Perron and Vogelsang (1992) call this the "innovational outlier" model. The dummy variable DU captures the impact on mean inflation over the post break-point period. The dummy is thus set to 1 following a break (i.e., t >T )and b 9
The statistical criteria used to find the "optimal" value for T are described in Perron and Vogelsang In particular, the above techniques tend to find more breaks than can perhaps be justified by an historical analysis. Also, in the present application, the likely breaks (e.g., oil shocks, exchange rate regime changes, monetary regime changes) all tend to occur in the latter part of the available data. equals 0 otherwise. The dummy DB attempts to capture the immediate impact of the break on inflation. The sign of 2 would indicate whether the shock was positive or negative. The dummy is, therefore, set to 1 only for the observation immediately following a break only (i.e., t = T + 1) and 0 otherwise. All other variables are b as previously defined. If the series is trend stationary around an estimated break-point, the null hypothesis that $ * = 1 is rejected which also implies that *…0. Recall that if inflation has a unit root then shocks to inflation, 1 due say to a change in a regime, are assumed to have a permanent effect while, under the alternative of trend stationarity, economic shocks have only transitory influences on the time series of interest.
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As in traditional unit root tests, (2) can be augmented by the addition of deterministic terms (e.g., a time trend) as well as by lagged changes in the dependent variable (usually referred to as lag augmentation terms) to correct for serial correlation in the residuals ,*. So far, the foregoing description allows for a single 19 break-point in the time series of interest. What if the inflation rate has been significantly affected by more than one event? For example, estimates presented in Table 3 essentially consider the possibility that two regimes, namely the end of Bretton Woods and the introduction of inflation targets, may have affected the time series properties of inflation. Bai (1997) , and Bai and Perron (1998) , consider the case of multiple structural breaks in a time series. They show that it is possible to apply the test described above in a sequential fashion. Thus, assume that the number of breaks, m, is unknown. Given a sample of length T, suppose that estimation of (2) yields a break-point at time T , where 1<T <T. We could then split up the sample into two sub-samples, Table 4 provides estimates using the sequential procedure to locate structural breaks in the data. Column (1) provides the estimated break-point dates, while columns (2), (3) and (4) provide estimates of $ , * and 2, * 1 respectively. Estimates of the deterministic components of the test equation are omitted to conserve space.
It should be noted that the adoption of inflation targets in Canada also coincided with the introduction 21 of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) in January 1991.
The amendments were passed into law in December 1986 but took effect in April 1987. In October 22 1986, the GST was also introduced in New Zealand. It is conceivable that some combination of the two events produced a structural break in inflation sometime in 1987. The RBNZ Act which formalized the reforms already in place was passed in December 1989 (the law became effective in February 1990). See Dawe (1992) and Hodgetts (1992) .
As pointed out previously (see Table 3 ), inflation appears to be highly persistent since the 1960s in all the countries examined. Consequently, it is difficult to reject the unit root hypothesis in inflation based on the results of Table 3. Table 4 , by contrast, asks whether the same unit root hypothesis can be rejected in favour of stationary inflation rate around one or more structural breaks. However, we are essentially interested in ascertaining whether such breaks as are detected by the data are associated with actual policy regimes changes. Of particular interest is whether the adoption of inflation targets can explain shifts in inflation persistence and the direction of the change.
A number of notable results emerge from the estimation of (2) as shown in Sweden and the UK, a shift in inflation persistence is dated a year or more before the formal adoption of inflation targeting. In the case of Australia, one structural break emerges approximately one year after the introduction of inflation control targets. Second, it is difficult to determine whether the estimated structural breaks can be explained either by the first oil price shock or the end of Bretton Woods. The difficulty here is that, in many instances, the two events are temporally close to each other. Also, assuming that the timing of the structural breaks are correctly specified, these appear to be explained by monetary policy actions other rather than those stemming from purely exchange rate regime change or institutional factors. (2) also provides evidence about the presence of a unit root inflation. Rejections of the null hypothesis of a unit root at various significance levels is indicated.
In 6 of the 7 inflation targeting countries, the "unit root" property in inflation, present in the era before inflation targeting were introduced, has either disappeared (e.g., as in Canada, New Zealand, UK), or marginally disappears (Australia, Spain). Sweden is the only country for which the null of a unit root could not be rejected.
Among the non-inflation targeting countries, the null of a unit root is rejected for the US alone for roughly for the post 1986 period. The same is generally true for the non-inflation targeting countries (except Germany perhaps). Given the relatively poor historical inflation performance of the inflation targeting countries ( Figure   1 ) the results are at least suggestive of the success of this policy to date.
Column (3) shows whether there were statistically significant changes in mean inflation after each structural break. Taking the US as an example, we see that mean inflation rates fell almost 1% since 1981:3
(.86%), although average inflation rates fell faster after 1991:2 (1.14%). Indeed, with a few exceptions, mena inflation rates have fallen significantly since the 1980s. In the case of Canada, Sweden, the UK and Germany, mean inflation rates dropped even faster in the early 1990s than before. Finally, column (4) asks how important was the impulse to a change in inflation in the period immediately following the estimated break-points.
Statistically significant inflation shocks have tended to be positive ones twice as often as negative shocks to have hit inflation. However, except for Canada and Germany, positive shocks have tended to occur in the early to mid 1980s with negative shocks reflecting events of the late 1980s or earky 1990s in the vast majority of cases.
How persuasive is the foregoing evidence? Those familiar with the literature on the persistence properties of time series will point out that the power of the statistical tests conducted so far to discriminate between the unit root and stationary alternatives is low. Nevertheless, the results do suggest the possibility that inflation targeting has had a significant impact on inflation persistence in several countries, though not in isolation from other institutional reforms that signaled enhanced central bank autonomy and monetary policy transparency.
Of course, specifications such as (1) and (2) do not directly measure the credibility of any announced policy change, especially of the inflation targeting variety. Figure 3 shows inflation performance in the total CPI, during the inflation control era only, relative to stated inflation targets. We see that while most countries have generally at least come close to achieving their targets, there have been some breaches of the inflation To be fair, central banks in inflation targeting countries assess inflation performance in terms of CPI 23 inflation net of supply side shocks and not inflation in the total CPI. Nevertheless, one of the credibility problems faced by inflation targeting countries is the potential for conflict or uncertainty stemming from the differential between these two measures of inflation. See Siklos (1997) .
No comparable data for Finland were available. The forecasts, except for New Zealand, are an average 24 of inflation forecasts by large banks across 14 countries surveyed by The Economist magazine. Siklos (1997 Siklos ( , 1998 conducts a more extensive and formal analysis of the evolution and significance of changes in inflation forecasts in Inflation targeting countries.
targets, even in countries where a significant shift in inflation persistence has been detected around the time of the adoption of such a policy. 23 An alternative view of the credibility issue asks whether inflationary expectations were significantly affected around the time inflation targeting were introduced. Figure 4 plots average annual total CPI inflation forecasts for inflation targeting countries around the time inflation targeting were adopted in each country.
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CPI inflation forecasts for a given year are released on a monthly basis beginning in the preceding year for which the forecast applies. We see that in all countries, except Australia, the announcement of inflation targeting led to a reduction in private sector expectations of future inflation with a short lag, although the impact effect is more pronounced in some countries (e.g., Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, and the UK) than in others and may partially explain some of the estimated break-points reported in Table 4 .
It should be pointed out, however, that the failure of inflation forecasts to adjust more rapidly perhaps to the fall in actual inflation -note the persistent differential between actual and forecasted inflation in several of the inflation targeting countries -may reflect residual uncertainty about whether the monetary and fiscal authorities would continue their commitment to the new policy regime. Mitigating this possibility is the fact that the current disinflation appears to be a "global" phenomenon, as noted earlier. Other evidence, not shown here (see Siklos 1998) , relying on estimates of the slope of the yield curve, also suggests that the introduction of targets was, for the most part, credible.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper has considered whether the adoption of inflation targets has affected the time series properties of inflation, both in relation to the past performance of inflation in countries that have adopted such a policy, and in comparison with the policy record of the US, Germany, and Switzerland. The latter group of countries are thought to have good inflation performance without having explicitly adopted an inflation target.
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Also examined was the role played by the design of the inflation target in particular, and institutional considerations more generally in accounting for the success of the policy.
Descriptive and econometric evidence suggest that the mere adoption of an inflation target is not sufficient in delivering consistently better inflation performance nor in influencing in a significant fashion inflationary expectations. Nevertheless, for a subset of countries, namely Canada, New Zealand and the UK, inflation persistence has dropped significantly from rather higher pre-inflation target levels. Moreover, the adoption of an inflation target in these countries has delivered significantly lower interest rates than would otherwise have been the case (Murchison and Siklos 1998) . Despite the apparent impact of inflation targets, and of associated reform to central banking operations, the fact remains that the disinflation of the 1990s is an international phenomenon. It remains to be seen whether inflation targeting can withstand pressures stemming from sustained breaches of their targets should inflation policies in the major industrialized countries begin to diverge. Also important is the question whether inflation targets can assist in delivering better long-run economic performance. The early reviews have not been favourable (e.g., Krugman 1996 , Fortin 1996 , but see Freedman and Macklem 1998, and Siklos 1997) , but it is rather too early to tell. Government-(Dec 1991) controlled prices C (2) 1.5-3.5%
C Interest, credit Although the target is formally specified in terms of overall CPI, the Bank focuses on the CPI excluding food, energy, and the effect of indirect taxes. 3.
The term of the new PTA coincides with the current term of the Governor which expires 31 August 2003. The PTAs were agreed to in December but are dated as beginning the following quarter for compatibility with subsequent empirical work. 4.
Since December 1997, the CPI excluding credit services is targeted. Prior to that date, overall CPI was targeted. 5.
The target represents an agreement between the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Bank of Canada and is not enshrined in the Bank of Canada Act. 6.
The Law of Autonomy was put in place in June 1994 and, although the inflation target was announced in December 1994, it was only formally adopted as of January 1, 1995. Between 1995 and 1997 the aim was to reduce inflation to the 2% range. In 1998, the aim is to keep the annual inflation rate "...close to 2%..." during the year. 7.
The Governor is, however, "available" to report on the conduct of monetary policy twice a year to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Financial Institutions and Public Administration. 8.
Finland reports quarterly on the inflation outlook in its Monthly Bulletin. 9.
Only since 12 June 1997.
Sources: Siklos (1997) Note: CPI inflation is measured at annual rates as 100 times (log CPI -log CPI ). Data are from OECD Main Economic Indicators:
Historical Statistics, and updated from most recent regular issues of this publication The US, Germany, and Switzerland, do not officially target inflation so the selection of the "post-Inflation Target" sample arbitrarily coincides with that of New Zealand. The full sample is generally 1958:1-1997:4, except for Finland, Spain (1963 Spain ( :1-1997 , and Switzerland (1961 Switzerland ( :1-1997 . The dating for the Bretton Woods and inflation targeting eras is provided in Tables 1 and 3 . For the non-inflation targeting countries, the sample 1990:1-1997:4 was used as a basis for comparison with the inflation record in inflation targeting countries. Table 1 and Johnson and Siklos (1996) for sources for the above dates. The inflation target and Bretton Woods dummies are zero prior to the dates shown above and one thereafter. In columns (3) through (6) standard errors are given in parenthesis. * signifies statistically significant at the 5% level; @ at the 1% level; and + at the 10% level. Inflation persistence Germany IT countries Switzerland US 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1994 23 Table 1 for details. Inflation rates in the CPI are at annual rates (also see Figure 1 ). 
